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ABSTRACT
Human beings are fundamentally social animals motivated by a need to establish
and maintain close social relationships. The creation of these relationships
inevitably leads to the creation of groups, along with a desire for power as a
method of determining how resources are to be allocated within these groups.
Most groups are characterized by individuals who belong to the ingroup and
those who are relegated to an outgroup, and one powerful motivator of ingroup
favoritism is religious affiliation. Although research has shown that feelings of
low power increase the drive to socially affiliate, research has not yet explored
how religious belief influences the relationship between power and social
affiliation. The current study explored how Christian participants primed with low
power react to potential social partners when they belong to their religious
ingroup or a differing religious outgroup. Findings indicated that when compared
to a neutral control, Christian participants elected to sit farther away from both a
Muslim and atheist who were ostensibly occupying a chair at the far end of a
table. Despite the increased need for social affiliation when experiencing low
power, the presence of a religious outgroup member may inhibit an individual’s
affiliative motivation.
Keywords: Power, Social Affiliation, Religion, Ingroup, Outgroup
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THE EFFECTS OF POWER AND RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED INGROUP
PREFERENCE ON SOCIAL AFFILIATION
Introduction
Human beings are fundamentally social animals motivated by a need to
establish and maintain close social relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).
Within most social groups, some individuals possess power and control over the
allocation and use of resources, whereas others do not (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, &
Magee, 2003). Recently, research has explored the intersection between the
domains of power and social affiliation. For example, people who are made to
feel powerless are more likely to seek out opportunities for social affiliation, which
can help them reestablish a sense of control (Case, Conlon, & Maner, 2015).
This research suggests that social affiliation motives are moderated by
psychological variables such as feelings of power.
But how does the psychological experience of power affect individuals
who belong to religious groups that are inherently affiliative? Indeed, research
has established the importance of religion as a means through which people
affiliate with others (Epley, Akalis, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2008). Although many
religions promote social closeness, it is also the case that religious individuals
tend not to associate with members of religious outgroups (Weeks & Vincent,
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2007). This begs the question: When religious individuals are made to feel
powerless, will they choose to affiliate with someone even when that person
belongs to a different religion? Although research has examined the relationship
between power and social affiliation, the question of how the cohesiveness of a
religious ingroup alters the human desire to socially affiliate with a member of a
religious outgroup under conditions of low power has yet to be tested empirically.
The Psychological Effects of Having (and Lacking) Power
Power—the ability to influence others’ outcomes through the control of
valuable resources (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006)—is a
fundamental aspect of hierarchically organized social groups. Power provides
freedom of action to those who have it while denying it to those who do not
(Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). When power is explored in the
psychological literature, it is generally defined not as the actual objective
possession of power over others, called structural power or social power (Neal &
Neal, 2011), but rather the experience of feelings of power. These feelings of
power, in turn, generate a host of cognitive, behavioral, and emotional
processes. One way of evoking these responses is through priming, a method of
nonconsciously activating a certain trait category within one situational context
with the intention of changing or affecting decision making or judgements in
another ostensibly unrelated situation (Bargh, 2006). Through priming, it is
2

possible to mimic the behavior and thought processes of those who are
objectively powerful or powerless by using the prime to create an elevated or
lowered sense of psychological power (see Galinsky et al., 2003; Smith & Trope,
2006; and Yang, Jin, He, Fan, & Zhu, 2015, for examples).
Because powerful individuals are free from the constraints that hold back
the powerless, they tend to place more emphasis on pursuing and accomplishing
their goals (Galinsky et al., 2003). Compared to the powerless, powerful
individuals tend to choose the direct course of action (Guinote, 2007) and are
able to sift through conflicting goals to efficiently select one to pursue (Schmid,
Kleiman, & Amodio, 2015). This drive to achieve goals typically leads the
powerful to prioritize their own goals at the expense of the goals of others. For
example, when faced with a credible threat to their power, individuals in positions
of authority will focus on the maintenance or increased acquisition of power at
the expense of group success (Maner & Mead, 2010). This is accomplished
through such actions as the withholding of valuable information from others, the
exclusion of skilled individuals who could pose a threat to their authority, or
outright deception (Maner & Mead, 2010). Those who experience heightened
power are less likely to adopt another person’s perspective, assume that other
people possess the same privileged knowledge they do, and have greater
difficulty experiencing emotional empathy (Galinsky et al., 2006). The powerful
are also more likely to cheat to benefit themselves (Dubois, Rucker, Galinsky,
3

2015) and to objectify subordinates, seeing them as objects to be used for their
own advancement (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008). In sum, the
experience of high power leads individuals to behave in predictably self-oriented
ways.
Typically, the opposite holds for individuals without power. Experiencing
lowered levels of power can cause individuals to seek out social affiliation with
people around them, both through increased interest in joining a social club as
well as sitting physically closer to others (Case et al., 2015). Experiencing low
power is associated with an unavoidable dependence on others and diminished
control over one’s surroundings, resulting in a desire to regain a sense of control
(Inesi, Botti, Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2011). As evidence of their increased
desire for social closeness, those primed with low power are willing to pay more
for an object when it is associated with status—a gauge of social acceptance—
than when it is not (Rucker & Galinsky, 2008). The powerless are also more
likely to lie or cheat, but only when it benefits others and not themselves (Dubois,
Rucker, Galinsky, 2015). In sum, lacking power increases people’s desire for
social belongingness and motivates action designed to enhance social
connection.
These effects of high and low power are consistent with the Social
Distance Theory of Power (Magee & Smith, 2013). The theory states that
powerful individuals possess the resources and agency that power provides,
4

which creates a sense of social distance between themselves and less powerful
individuals on whom they need not depend. Powerless individuals, in contrast,
possess a need to close the psychological distance between themselves and
others as a way to accomplish their goals through mutual dependence. As a
result, those who are powerful should display a decreased need for social
affiliation and prefer independent activities that do not require them to rely on
others. Those without power, on the other hand, should display an increased
need for social affiliation and prefer group activities that create a sense of mutual
interdependence (Magee & Smith, 2013).
Social Affiliation and Religion
The drive to socially affiliate is a powerful and complex human motivation.
Social affiliation refers to the drive to establish and maintain positive social
interactions with other individuals or groups (Van Cappellen, Fredrickson,
Saroglou, & Corneille, 2017) through specific attitudes, emotions, and behaviors
that promote closeness (Sasaki & Kim, 2011). This drive is primarily
characterized by an innate desire to interact and take pleasure in being with
fellow human beings and is generally considered one of the basic motivations
which govern the species (McClelland, 1987). Not surprisingly, people generally
affiliate with those who most resemble themselves (Côté, Kraus, Carpenter, Piff,
Beermann, & Keltner, 2017).
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One key way in which people affiliate with similar others is through
organized religion. The word religion comes from the Latin word “religare,” which
means “to bind” (Van Cappellen et al., 2017). Although the terms religion and
religiosity are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature, they refer to
slightly different concepts with nuanced and important differences (Gmel, MohlerKuo, Dermota, Gaume, Bertholet, Daeppen, & Studer, 2013). Indeed, definitions
of religion and religiosity vary across academic fields. In psychology, religiosity is
usually defined as the internal and external behaviors and beliefs that are
practiced within a religion, while religion itself is defined as a unified system of
beliefs and practices that revolve around the sacred (Graham & Haidt, 2010).
Religion is further broken down into religious denominations (RDs), referring to
the specific sect or belief system that the individual adheres to, such as an
individual considering him or herself Jewish, Catholic, Muslim, Mormon, or
Seventh-Day Adventist (Gmel et al., 2013).
Religion has been a prominent feature of many societies since ancient
times, evolving as a vehicle for providing stability, order, and meaning to people’s
lives. From this perspective, religion also serves as a vehicle for social affiliation
through the binding of people together in a shared faith. Indeed, affiliation with
those who share the same faith is a central aspect of most religions (Epley et al.,
2008). Spending time with similar others and engaging in shared religious belief
and practice fosters a strong sense of connection and shared purpose among
6

religious individuals. This sense of shared community may partly explain why
individuals who self-identify as religious tend to be more altruistic, or at least are
viewed as altruistic by their peers (Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette, Verschueren, &
Dernelle, 2005). Despite fostering the bonds of social connection, evidence
suggests that religiously motivated altruism is seemingly limited to an individual’s
religious ingroup. That is, religious individuals may display favoritism or bias
towards those whom they believe share the same faith as they do while
excluding those who do not (Galen, 2012).
Ingroup Preference
The inherent preference toward those who belong to an ingroup and
exclusion of those who belong to an outgroup is a central aspect of human
behavior. The division of the social world into “us” and “them” is a phenomenon
that starts as early as 11 months in children and is culturally universal (Mahajan
& Wynn, 2012). Human beings generally define themselves by the particular
groups they belong to, such as a nation, political party, or religion (Balliet, Wu, &
De Dreu, 2014). This labeling and belonging behavior stems from a drive to
increase the success and functioning of an individual’s particular group, which
provides increased survivability, group cohesiveness, and other long-term
benefits (Brewer, 1999; Van Vugt & Park, 2009).
The preference for one’s ingroup is an ingrained aspect of human social
behavior and is an especially powerful aspect inherent in religious belief. When
7

religious traditions speak of compassion for others and fair treatment, they
typically limit these maxims to those who belong to the same religious tradition
(Graham & Haidt, 2010). The Old Testament and the Qur’an specifically
command that loyalty and self-sacrifice be focused primarily on the religious
ingroup, thus creating trust and reciprocity within while excluding these benefits
from those who do not belong (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Individuals tend to view
members of their own religious ingroup more positively than members of religious
outgroups (Galen, Williams, & Ver Wey, 2014). Although in modern times these
moral commandments have been relaxed when it comes to members of religious
outgroups (Ramsay, Tong, Pang, & Chowdhury, 2016), loyalty to the group
remains a strong tenant of religion in general.
Shared religious belief is one of the strongest predictors of ingroup
favoritism and outgroup exclusion across many diverse domains (Weeks &
Vincent, 2007). People are more likely to give money to a stranger when they
believe the individual belongs to their own religious group (Fitzgerald & Wickwire,
2012). In a similar vein, those high in religiosity view those who outwardly
display signs of religiosity as more likeable than those who have no such outward
displays—but only when that individual belongs to the same religion as they do
(Bobkowski & Kalyanaraman, 2010). Religion, then, can serve as a vehicle for
bringing people together, but it can also foster ingroup bias (Preston, Ritter, &
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Hernandez, 2010) and create a clear division between those in the ingroup (“us”)
and those in the outgroup (“them”).
Present Research
Although the desire to socially affiliate is a strong human motivator,
research has shown that the desire for social affiliation depends on one’s level of
power. In particular, when experiencing lowered levels of power, individuals
express an increased desire to engage in social affiliation and seek out
opportunities for social contact (Case et al., 2015). It is unknown, however, how
power affects affiliative desire among religious individuals, especially when
religious individuals tend to favor interacting with members of the ingroup over
outgroups.
Social affiliation and religiosity are strongly related, indicating that religion
is a vehicle through which human beings can fulfill their drive to socially affiliate
with others (Strawbridge, Shema, Cohen, & Kaplan, 2001). However, the drive
to socially affiliate diminishes when the target of affiliation is revealed to be a
member of a religious outgroup who is different from that of the individual
seeking to socially affiliate. For example, when the individual desiring to socially
affiliate is a Christian and the target of affiliation is revealed as an atheist, the
drive to socially affiliate diminishes significantly (Van Cappellen et al., 2017).
Similar research has found that when faced with a resource allocation task,
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Christians consistently favor those who share their religious beliefs while
assigning fewer resources to atheists (Cowgill, Rios, & Simpson, 2017).
Building on these two findings—that low power increases the need for
social affiliation and that religious outgroups are not preferable targets for social
affiliation—the present research tested the hypothesis that priming low power will
increase the need for social affiliation in a Christian individual, but only when the
target of that affiliation is a Christian as well. When the Christian participant is
informed that the only available target of social affiliation is a member of a
religious outgroup (either an atheist or a Muslim), the need for social affiliation
will decrease when compared to a member of the religious ingroup. Given
existing evidence regarding the general level of animosity that exists towards
Islam in the West (Shaver, Troughton, Sibley, & Bulbulia, 2016), it is predicted
that Christian participants will display less of an inclination to socially affiliate with
a Muslim than with an atheist.
In the current study, individuals who identified as belonging to Christian
denominations were primed with low power using a dyadic task, and their drive to
affiliate with members of a religious outgroup (atheist, Muslim) or ingroup
(Christian) was assessed. It was hypothesized that when Christians faced the
prospect of interacting with a fellow Christian, they would display an increased
level of social affiliation, but when presented with an atheist or a Muslim, they
would display a decreased desire for social affiliation. Specifically, I
10

hypothesized that when primed with low power and therefore seeking to socially
affiliate, Christian participants would sit farther away from those who belonged to
a religious outgroup (i.e., atheists and Muslims), although farther away from a
Muslim than an atheist, while sitting closer to those who belonged to the same
religious ingroup (Christian). These conditions were compared against a neutral
control condition (i.e., partner with no religion mentioned) to establish a baseline
of behavior. This desire to affiliate was measured on a scale from 1 to 4, with
each number corresponding to the chairs available from left to right. For
example, chair 1 was the chair right next to the ostensible partner’s chair, while
chair 4 was the farthest from the partner. In this way, physical closeness to the
ostensible partner served as a measure of participants’ affiliative motivation.
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Method
Participants
Results of a power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007) indicated that 120 participant responses were required in order to
obtain sufficient power to test the hypotheses. Participants were undergraduate
students enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Stephen F. Austin State
University (SFA) who self-identified as belonging to a Christian denomination.
This included those who identified as Catholic, Protestant (e.g., Baptist,
Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Anglican, Evangelical), Eastern Orthodox,
and the many other sects contained within Christianity. Consistent with previous
research (see Burris & Petrican, 2011), participants who belonged to these and
other similar denominations were included under the umbrella of Christianity for
the sake of simplicity. Participants in this study earned partial credit toward a
course requirement.
The initial sample contained a total of 129 participant responses. After
conducting data cleanup, 16 participants were excluded as they did not selfidentify as a Christian, resulting in a final sample of 113 participants (90 females,
23 males). More than half of the participants identified as White (63%). Other
races in the sample included Black or African American (26%), unknown or not
reported (5%), more than one race (4.5%), American Indian/Alaska Native
12

(1.8%), and Asian (0.9%). About a quarter of the sample (25.7%) identified as
Hispanic or Latino. Socioeconomic status (SES) was measured by asking
participants to estimate the SES of their parents. Most participants identified as
middle class (49.6%).
Materials
Demographics. Demographic data included the participants’ age,
gender, race, ethnicity, academic standing, SES, and questions pertaining to
participants’ belief in God and religious denomination.
Ten Item Personality Inventory. The Ten Item Personality Inventory
(TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) is a 10-item measure designed to
examine five basic aspects of personality: extraversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, emotional stability (neuroticism), and openness to
experience. Participants were asked to rate themselves using a seven-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 7 (Agree strongly) on items
such as “Extraverted, enthusiastic” and “Disorganized, careless.” Items were
reverse-scored and averaged to form a composite index for each of the five
aspects of personality (alphas ranged from .46 to .77).
Dominance and Prestige Scales. Participant levels of dominance and
prestige were measured with a 17-item self-report scale developed by Cheng,
Tracy, and Henrich (2010). The scale is comprised of two subscales, one
measuring dominance and the other measuring prestige. The Dominance
13

subscale includes items such as “I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my
way” and “Others know it is better to let me have my way,” while the Prestige
subscale includes items such as “Others seek my advice on a variety of matters”
and “Members of my peer group respect and admire me.” Responses were
given using a seven-point Likert scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). Items
were reverse-scored and averaged to form composite measures of dominance (α
= .73) and prestige (α = .71), respectively.
Personal Sense of Power Scale. The individual experience of
psychological power was measured using the eight-item Personal Sense of
Power Scale (PSPS; Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012). The measure includes
questions such as “My ideas and opinions are often ignored” and “If I want to, I
get to make the decisions” measured using a seven-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (Disagree strongly) to 7 (Agree strongly). Appropriate items were reversescored and averaged to form an overall measure of power (α = .82), with higher
scores indicating a greater personal sense of power.
Interaction Anxiousness Scale. The 15-item Interaction Anxiousness
Scale (IAS; Leary, 1983) measures the extent to which a person worries about
social interactions. This scale was included to control for participant levels of
anxiousness regarding social interaction. The measure includes questions such
as “I usually feel comfortable when I'm in a group of people I don't know” and “I
usually feel relaxed around other people, even people who are quite different
14

from me.” Items were scored on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at
all characteristic of me) to 5 (Extremely characteristic of me). Appropriate items
were reverse-scored and summed to form an overall measure of interaction
anxiousness (α = .83), with higher scores indicating greater anxiousness.
Brief Mood Introspection Scale. The Brief Mood Introspection Scale
(BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) is a 16-item scale designed to assess
participants’ mood and arousal. This measure was included to ensure that any
differences in social affiliation following the power prime were due to the priming
of low power and not fluctuations in mood or arousal. Responses were given
using a four-point Likert scale from 1 (Definitely do not feel) to 4 (Definitely feel)
and included questions aimed at determining mood (e.g., “content” and “happy”)
and arousal (e.g., “lively” and “jittery”). Scoring depended on the particular
subscale (Pleasant-Unpleasant Mood or Arousal-Calm Mood), whereby the
appropriate questions were reverse-scored and then added onto the total of the
regular scored responses (α = .82 and α = .54, respectively). At the end of the
scale, participants were asked to rate their overall mood as well as to indicate
how powerful they felt on a 1-7 scale.
Procedure
After the study was reviewed and approved by the SFA Institutional
Review Board (IRB), participants were recruited and signed up through the SFA
SONA Systems website. This was an in-person study. Participants arrived at
15

the lab room at the proscribed date and time and sat in front of a computer where
they provided informed consent to participate in the research (see Appendix A).
Participants were then informed that the study consisted of two phases, the first
completed alone and the second completed with a partner. All scales were
completed on a computer.
Next, participants completed the demographics (Appendix B), TIPI
(Appendix C), the Dominance and Prestige Scales (Appendix D), PSPS
(Appendix E), and the IAS (Appendix F). In keeping with previous research,
participants were informed that their responses to these questionnaires would
determine their role in the second phase of the experiment. This was done to
legitimize participants’ assignment to power condition, as previous research has
shown that the effects of a power prime hold best when the prime is perceived as
legitimate (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2008). After completing these
measures, participants were primed with low power using instructions adapted
from previous research. Participants were informed that, based on their
responses to the scales, they had been assigned to the role of the builder on a
dyadic task that involves building a structure (called a Tanagram) from a set of
Legos with a partner. (In reality, there was no partner; this deception was used
to increase participant confidence in the cover story.) Specifically, participants
were told the following:
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“As a builder, you will have the responsibility of carrying out the task of
building a Tanagram according to instructions given to you by your partner
(the manager). Your manager will call you in to give you instructions when
ready. Your manager will decide how to structure the process for building
the Tanagram and the standards by which the work is to be evaluated.
Which tasks you complete will be decided by the manager. In addition,
you will be evaluated by the manager at the end of the session. This
evaluation will be private; that is, you will not see your manager’s
evaluation of you. This evaluation will help determine how the
experimental credits for being in this experiment will be divided between
the manager and you. You will not have an opportunity to evaluate your
manager. Only the manager will be in charge of directing production,
evaluating your performance, and determining the rewards you will
receive.”
This dyadic task has been used extensively in previous research (e.g., Case et
al., 2015; Galinsky et al. 2003) as an effective means of priming the
psychological experience of low power.
The participants (all of whom were primed with low power) were then
instructed to build a Tanagram model (see Appendix G) exactly as instructed by
their ostensible partner, whom they had yet to meet and had been “assigned” the
role of manager. They were then informed that their partner was running late
17

and were asked to complete the BMIS (Appendix H), which was included to rule
out the possibility that participants’ response to the power prime was due to
general changes in mood or affect.
Next, participants were told that the researcher needed to relocate them to
a different lab room down the hall, ostensibly to allow the researcher enough time
to set up the second phase of the experiment in the original lab room. The lab
room contained a large straight table with five individual chairs, all in a linear row
on the same side of the table, the leftmost of which had a backpack, notebook,
and pen (adapted from van Cappellen et al., 2017) to indicate the presence of
another individual. Depending on the condition to which the participant had been
randomly assigned, the participant was told: “We actually share the lab room with
another research assistant… [For Christian condition:] who is conducting a
study on the psychology of Christianity with only Christian participants. It’s an
interesting study.” [For atheist condition:] “who is conducting a study on the
psychology of atheism with only atheist participants. It’s an interesting study.”
[For Muslim condition:] “who is conducting a study on the psychology of Islam
with only Muslim participants. It’s an interesting study.” Then, for all conditions,
the researcher said: “Oh, it looks like their participant is already here and will be
back. But it is fine for you to wait here. Just have a seat, and I’ll be back
shortly.”
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After closing the lab room door, the experimenter then recorded which of
the four available chairs the participant chose to sit in (numbered 1 through 4,
with “1” being closest to the ostensibly waiting individual and “4” being farthest;
see Appendix I). This recording took place through a one-way mirror in the event
that a participant changed seats after the researcher left the room. After waiting
two minutes, the researcher returned to the lab room, explained that there was
no partner or Tanagram task, and debriefed the participant on the true purpose of
the study and the reason for deception to test the hypothesis. Participants were
probed for suspicion regarding the hypothesis and thanked for their participation.
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Results
Preliminary Analyses
Because all participants were primed with low power, a preliminary
analysis was conducted before the main analysis to assess for pre-prime
differences in feelings of power. A one way between-subjects ANOVA revealed
no differences across conditions in personal sense of power, F(3, 109) = 0.28, p
= .84, suggesting that all participants reported similar levels of power prior to the
low power prime.
To ensure that any differences in social affiliative desire were not due
simply to changes in mood or arousal, possible effects on current valence were
assessed. No significant differences across religious conditions were found for
either current mood valance (F = 1.00, p = 0.39) or current arousal (F = 1.04, p =
0.38).
Main Analysis
A one way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to test the
hypothesis that Christian participants would choose to sit farther from an atheist
or Muslim while sitting closer to a fellow Christian or a target for whom no religion
was mentioned. The religious denomination of the individual in the waiting room
(four levels: Christian, atheist, Muslim, and no religion control) was the
independent variable, and social affiliative desire (as measured by chair
20

distance) was the dependent variable. Higher scores (on a 1 to 4 scale)
indicated a desire for greater physical distance from the ostensible individual in
the waiting room. Interaction anxiousness was included as a covariate to control
for participants’ general level of anxiousness when interacting with others.
There was a significant effect of condition on social affiliative desire after
controlling for the effect of anxiety, F(3, 108) = 8.57, p < .001, η2 = .19 (see
Appendix J)¹. Planned contrasts revealed that Christian participants in the
atheist condition (n = 26, M = 3.27, SD = .92), p = .02, 95% CI [.08, 1.04], and
Muslim condition (n = 30, M = 3.63, SD = .67), p < .001, 95% CI [.46, 1.39], were
significantly more likely to sit farther away from the ostensible individual in the
waiting room compared to the Christians in the Christian condition (n = 27, M =
2.70, SD = .87). Christians in the Christian condition did not significantly differ
from participants in the control condition (n = 30, M = 2.63, SD = 1.03), p = .73,
95% CI [-.38, .55]. Christian participants in the atheist condition, p = .007, 95%
CI [.18, 1.11], and Muslim condition, p < .001, 95% CI [.55, 1.46], were
significantly more likely to sit farther away from the waiting individual compared
to the control condition.
These results indicate that, as predicted, Christian participants increased
social distance from a Muslim and an atheist whom they were told was ostensibly
sitting at the far end of the table. Conversely, no such drive to increase social
distance was observed when Christian participants were informed of the
¹ When the analysis was conducted with only female participants, the F value dropped to 5.8, but
significance remained at p < .001.
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presence of a fellow Christian or someone for whom no religion was mentioned
(see Appendix K for a bar graph of the number of chair selections by religious
condition). Social anxiety was included in the analysis as an a priori covariate.
In supplemental analyses, race, socioeconomic status, sex, age, intensity of
religious belief, and political beliefs were all examined as potential covariates, but
none of these variables were significantly correlated with the dependent variable.
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Discussion
Human beings are social creatures who organize themselves into groups,
and within these groups, some individuals rise to positions of power and authority
over others. Power affords these individuals control over valuable resources,
whereas those with less power become dependent on others to achieve their
goals. Previous research has established that experiencing low power increases
people’s desire for social affiliation. However, while social affiliation is a
fundamental human motivation, religious individuals generally prefer to affiliate
with members of their ingroup at the expense of interacting with religious
outgroup members (Galen, 2012).
The goal of the present study was to explore how Christian participants
experiencing lowered levels of psychological power would respond towards
members of their religious ingroup as well as members of religious outgroups.
To test this experimentally, Christian participants were placed in a situation
where they had to choose where to sit relative to someone they were told was
either a Christian, an atheist, a Muslim, or an individual for whom no religion was
mentioned. It bears mentioning that power was not manipulated in this study, as
all participants, regardless of condition, received a low power prime. Instead, the
actual condition itself was manipulated, although no manipulation check was
included to ensure that participants heard and processed the religious identity of
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the individual with whom they ostensibly shared the waiting room. Nonetheless,
results confirmed the hypothesis that Christian participants would sit closer to
fellow Christians (members of their own religious ingroup) while sitting farther
away from both atheists and Muslims. When Christians were compared against
a neutral control condition, no such drive to increase distance was observed.
Together, these results suggest that the primed drive to affiliate in
Christian individuals who lacked power was not enough to overcome the strong
ingroup preferences members of this religious group held. As predicted,
Christian participants sat furthest away from an ostensible Muslim individual,
which may have resulted from current cultural attitudes towards Muslims (Shaver
et al., 2016) or a clear ingroup/outgroup distinction between practictioners of the
Christian and Islamic faiths. In any case, it appears that Christians drew a clear
distinction between themselves and these two religious outgroups that even low
power—and the theorized increase in affiliative desire that results—could not
transcend.
Consistent with previous research on the perception of atheists and
Muslims as value-threatening outgroups by Christian participants (see Van
Cappellen et al., 2017; Van der Noll, Saroglou, Latour, & Dolezal, 2017), the
present study found that both groups were shunned as targets of social affiliation,
although atheists less so than Muslims. This indicates that although Christian
participants were wary of socially affiliating with both groups, atheism was the
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less threatening of the two. This finding can possibly be explained by the fact
that the population from which the experimental sample was drawn were college
students. Although previous research has found negative views towards atheists
among Christian college students (Bowman, Rockenbach, Mayhew, RiggersPiehl, & Hudson, 2017), it is possible that they do not find them necessarily
threatening in the same way in which Islam is popularly perceived (Alexander,
2013). An atheist, while a member of a religious outgroup, is still perceived as
belonging to the ingroup represented by the Western liberal and scientific
tradition, while a Muslim (in popular perception), belongs to neither (Van der Noll
et al., 2017). The present study also examined the desire of Christians to affiliate
with both Muslims and atheists concurrently as opposed to in isolation, as in
previous research, which may have forced Christians to sit closer to the lesser of
two disliked outgroups.
It is perhaps not surprising, given the current socio-political climate in the
United States, that a Muslim might represent the least favorable target for social
affiliation. Anti-Muslim attitudes are pervasive in the United States and
elsewhere in the West (Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009). There is evidence
from countries that have not been the direct target of terrorist attacks that there is
still a confabulation between Arab and Muslim as if one is naturally the other
(Shaver et al., 2016). This implies that there may be several underlying reasons
for anti-Muslim atittudes in the West, where personal religious differences (that
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is, differing theological views) encompass only one of several possible
explanations (Shaver et al., 2016). Despite the inclusion of all Christian sects
under a single umbrella for the purposes of this study, researchers have found
differences in attitudes towards Muslims among different Christian sects. For
example, Catholics are among those who have the most positive view of Muslims
while Mormons have the least positive views (Zainiddinov, 2013). It is also
possible that this effect is less religiously motivated and instead the result of
consistent media portrayal of Muslims as a threatening outgroup and the
subsequent reactions of the majority ingroup (Cinnirella, Leman, Hastings, &
Whitbread, 2009).
The findings of the present study are consistent with the Social Distance
Theory of Power, which holds that the powerful will create social distance
between themselves and the powerless (Magee & Smith, 2013). Christian
participants, who belong to the majority faith in the United States (Pew Research
Center, 2014), may experience a sense of elevated power over both atheists and
Muslims. As a result, Christians may both prefer social distance from these
groups as well as view them with distrust, paranoia, apprehension, and as
intruders into an already established culture (Lopes & Jaspal, 2015). Indeed,
research has found that majority native born populations typically view the
acquisition of political power by Muslim immigrants as a threat to their existing
power (Verkuyten, Hindriks, & Coenders, 2016). Because atheists and Muslims
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are traditionally underrepresented groups in both business and political realms
(Pew Research Center, 2017), perceived attempts to gain power or achieve
egalitarian status by these groups may be met with suspicion or hostility by
Christians.
Limitations and Future Directions
The current study had several limitations that should be considered when
interpreting the results. The study lacked a true manipulation check to ascertain
whether participants heard and were aware of the conditionally dependent
dialogue. Although differences were observed between conditions, it is
impossible to know whether the manipulation was successful. In addition, it is
possible that the dependent variable (chair selection) is not as sensitive to
variance as one that relies on measuring the physical distance between chairs,
as was done in Case et al. (2015). The measurement of physical distance could
reflect more nuanced preferences for social distance than what was captured by
having participants select among numbered chairs.
Because of the lack of manipulation check data, the effect size reported in
the current study must also be interpreted with caution. As with any controlled
experiment conducted in a laboratory, it is difficult to predict how these findings
would play out in the real world. For example, outside the lab, an individual’s
religious belief is rarely shared as explicitly as was done in the current study. For
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example, physicians struggle with religious self-disclosure to patients even when
directly asked (Canzona, Peterson, Villagran, & Seehusen, 2015). Even on
social media, a medium which encourages self-disclosure, only 30% of
individuals mention religious topics outside of the religion designated field in their
profile (Bobkowski & Pearce, 2011).
In addition, unlike the controlled environment provided by a laboratory
setting where individuals are aware they are being observed, in the outside world
this is rarely a salient consideration for most individuals. In support of this notion,
approximately 39% of participants in the current study expressed suspicion that
their actions were being monitored or that the researchers were observing their
behavior for some unknown purpose, which may have affected their responses.
Despite the relatively high suspicion rate, only one individual (who did not identify
as Christian and was therefore excluded from the analysis) correctly guessed the
hypothesis². Another related limitation is that most of the data were collected at
the end of the semester, a time when most participants have been exposed to
the use of deception in psychological research. Another possible limitation is the
time it took each individual to pick a seat. Due to the study design and the
reliance on deception, the researcher was unable to observe the time it took for
participants to decide on a seat. Future studies could include time to make a
decision as a variable that could be included as a covariate, perhaps through the

² The data were re-analyzed excluding the roughly 39% of suspicious participants, but the results were
unchanged.
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use of video recording which would allow the researcher to record time to seat
accurately and unobtrusively.
While the present study controlled for the social anxiety of participants,
this is not the only possible confound present when researching how power
affects social affiliative behavior. Future studies could include other variables as
covariates, such as extant levels of individual power or religious fundamentalism.
Power is not experienced in the same manner by all individuals, and future
studies should attempt to further explore the relationship among psychological
power, social affiliation, and related variables. Similarly, although those high in
religious fundamentalism display high levels of religious belief, there is (in many
cases) a difference in attitude and behavior towards dissimilar others (outgroups)
when comparing religious fundamentalists and otherwise low fundamentalismhigh religious belief individuals (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017).
One final consideration is that the sample was predominately female
(80%). Of the final sample, fully 48% was female and white, a demographic
breakdown which could inform the final results given that half the sample was
demographically similar. Research has established that women experience
already lowered levels of power in society compared to men, especially in the
political, academic, and business worlds (see Dresden, Dresden, Ridge, &
Yamawaki, 2018; Nelson, Bronstein, Shacham, & Ben‐Ari, 2015). Therefore, it is
possible that women enter situations such as the one encountered in the present
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research with an already diminished level of power, which may have been
lowered further by the power prime. Future research should consider potential
pre-existing sex differences in feelings of power and their effect on outcomes
related to power.
Conclusion
Lowered levels of psychological power increase the desire to socially
affiliate, but no matter how universal the human drive for social affiliation might
be, not all targets for social affiliation are perceived in the same manner. The
current study suggests that Christian individuals will instinctively view Muslims
and atheists as members of an outgroup, regardless of any increase in affiliative
desire accompanied by lowered power and will consequently increase the social
distance between them and these religious outgroup members. It would seem,
then, that one major purpose of religion—to bind—extends primarily to members
of religious ingroups, and that the experience of powerlessness is not enough to
encourage bonds of social connection between members of religious outgroups.
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APPENDIX A
Stephen F. Austin State University
Informed Consent Document

STUDY TITLE: Behavior in Partnership Tasks
PURPOSE: The current study is conducted by student researcher Hernan
Escobar under the supervision of Dr. Kyle Conlon from the department of
Psychology at Stephen F. Austin State University. The study will explore
individual behavior in tasks that require partnership to complete.
DURATION: Participation in this study is expected to take approximately 30
minutes.
PROCEDURES: If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to
complete several surveys, a demographics questionnaire, and participate in a
goal-oriented task with a partner.
CONFIDENTIALITY: The records of this study will be kept private. Your name
will not be attached to answers you provide. The researchers will have access to
the raw data. In any resulting publication or presentation, we will not include any
information that will make it possible to identify a participant. Once collected, all
data will be kept in secured files, in accordance with the standards of SFASU and
federal regulations. We will make every effort to protect your privacy.
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF THE STUDY: Your participation in this study is
voluntary. In addition, you may choose not to respond to individual items in the
surveys. Your decision whether to participate will not affect your current or future
relations with SFASU or any of its faculty, staff, or representatives. If you decide
to participate in this study, you are free to withdraw from the study at any time
without affecting those relationships and without penalty or loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled.
POTENTIAL RISKS: The researcher anticipates no potential risks associated
with your participation in this study, besides those inherent in any psychological
evaluation. Mild boredom or fatigue is possible while completing surveys. If you
experience negative affect as a result of participating in this study, you may
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contact SFASU Counseling Services, located on the 3rd floor of the Rusk
Building, or contact their office at (936) 468-2401 or counseling@sfasu.edu.
ANTICIPATED BENEFITS: The current study has the potential to inform your
own and others’ understanding of important variables related to how religious
belief can influence goal-related tasks done conducted with the help of others.
COMPENSATION: In exchange for your participation, you will receive 1 credit for
every 30 minutes of research participation or credit in an amount that is
considered appropriate by your course instructor. This study is worth 1 credit.
CONTACT: If you have any questions or concerns about being in this study, you
should contact Hernan Escobar at escobarha1@jacks.sfasu.edu or Dr. Kyle
Conlon at conlonke@sfasu.edu or (936) 468-1572. Additionally, you may also
contact the SFASU Office of Research and Sponsored Programs at
osrp@sfasu.edu or (936) 468-6606 if you would like more information regarding
your rights as a research participant.
STATEMENT OF CONSENT
The procedures of this study have been explained to me and my questions have
been addressed. The information that I provide is confidential and will be used for
research purposes only. I am at least 18 years of age. I understand that my
participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time without penalty. I
have read the information in this consent form and I agree to be in the study. I
will receive a copy of this consent form for my records upon my request.

Yes, I agree to participate
No, I do not agree to participate
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APPENDIX B
Demographics
Instructions: Please provide the following information by indicating your answer
for each question:
1) Sex: Male

Female

Transgender

Prefer not to answer

2) Age (in years):
3) I would describe my ethnicity as (choose ONE):
1. Hispanic or Latino
2. Not Hispanic or Latino
4) I would describe my race as (choose ONE):
1. American Indian/Alaska Native
2. Asian
3. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
4. Black or African American
5. White
6. More than one race
7. Unknown or Not reported
5) My academic standing is (choose ONE):
1. Freshman
2. Sophomore
3. Junior
4. Senior
5. Graduate student
6) How spiritual are you?
1
Not at all
spiritual

2

3

4

5
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6

7
Very spiritual

7) How religious are you?
1
Not at all
religious

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very religious

8) What religion or religious denomination are you?:

9) Do you believe in the existence of God?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Prefer not to answer
10) If YES:
How confident are you that God exists?
1
Not at all
confident

2

3

4

5

6

7
Very confident

11) Please indicate which of the following most closely represents your
parents’ socioeconomic status.
1. Poverty
2. Lower Middle Class
3. Middle Class
4. Upper Middle Class
5. Wealthy
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APPENDIX C
Ten-Item Personality Inventory
(Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003)
Instructions: Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply
to you. Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to
which you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to
which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more
strongly than the other.
1
Disagree
strongly

2
3
Disagree Disagree
moderately
a little

4
5
6
7
Neither Agree a
Agree
Agree
agree
little
moderately strongly
nor
disagree

I see myself as:
1. _____ Extraverted, enthusiastic.
2. _____ Critical, quarrelsome.
3. _____ Dependable, self-disciplined.
4. _____ Anxious, easily upset.
5. _____ Open to new experiences, complex.
6. _____ Reserved, quiet.
7. _____ Sympathetic, warm.
8. _____ Disorganized, careless.
9. _____ Calm, emotionally stable.
10. _____ Conventional, uncreative.
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APPENDIX D
Dominance-Prestige Scales
(Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010)

Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which each statement accurately
describes you by writing the appropriate number from the scale below in the
space provided.
1
Not at all

2

3

4
5
Somewhat

6

7
Very
much

1.

Members of my peer group respect and admire me.

2.

Members of my peer group do NOT want to be like me.

3.

I enjoy having control over others.

4.

Others always expect me to be successful.

5.

I often try to get my own way regardless of what others may want.

6.

Others do NOT value my opinion.

7.

I am willing to use aggressive tactics to get my way.

8.

I am held in high esteem by those I know.

9.

I try to control others rather than permit them to control me.

10.

I do NOT have a forceful or dominant personality.

11.

Others know it is better to let me have my way.

12.

I do NOT enjoy having authority over other people.

13.

My unique talents and abilities are recognized by others.

14.

I am considered an expert on some matters by others.

15.

Others seek my advice on a variety of matters.

16.

Some people are afraid of me.

17. _____ Others do NOT enjoy hanging out with me.
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APPENDIX E
Personal Sense of Power Scale
(Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012)

In rating each of the items below, please use the following scale:
1
Disagree
strongly

2

3

Disagree Disagree
a little

4

5

6

7

Neither
agree
nor
disagree

Agree
a
little

Agree

Agree
strongly

In my relationships with others...
1.

I can get them to listen to what I say.

2.

My wishes do not carry much weight. (r)

3.

I can get them to do what I want.

4.

Even if I voice them, my views have little sway. (r)

5.

I think I have a great deal of power.

6.

My ideas and opinions are often ignored. (r)

7.

Even when I try, I am not able to get my way. (r)

8.

If I want to, I get to make the decisions.
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APPENDIX F
Interaction Anxiousness Scale
(Leary, 1983)
Indicate how characteristic each of the following statements is of you
according to the following scale:

1

2

3

4

5

Not at all

Slightly

Moderatel

Very

Extremely

characteri

characteri

y

characteri

characteri

stic of me

stic of me

characteri

stic of me

stic of me

stic of me

_____ 1. I often feel nervous even in casual get-togethers.
_____ 2. I usually feel comfortable when I'm in a group of people I don't know.
_____ 3. I am usually at ease when speaking to a member of the other sex.
_____ 4. I get nervous when I must talk to a teacher or a boss.
_____ 5. Parties often make me feel anxious and uncomfortable.
_____ 6. I am probably less shy in social interactions than most people.
_____ 7. I sometimes feel tense when talking to people of my own sex if I
don't know them very well.
_____ 8. I would be nervous if I was being interviewed for a job.
_____ 9. I wish I had more confidence in social situations.
_____ 10. I seldom feel anxious in social situations.
_____ 11. In general, I am a shy person.
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_____ 12. I often feel nervous when talking to an attractive member of the
opposite sex.
_____ 13. I often feel nervous when calling someone I don't know very well
on the telephone.
_____ 14. I get nervous when I speak to someone in a position of authority.
_____ 15. I usually feel relaxed around other people, even people who are
quite different from me.
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APPENDIX G
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APPENDIX H
Brief Mood Introspection Scale
(Mayer & Gaschke, 1988)
Instructions: Circle the response on the scale below that indicates how well
each adjective or phrase describes your present mood.
1

2

3

4

Definitely do
not feel

Do not feel

Slightly feel

Definitely feel

Lively
Happy
Sad
Tired
Caring
Content
Gloomy
Jittery

Drowsy
Grouchy
Peppy
Nervous
Calm
Loving
Fed up
Active

Overall, my mood is:
1
2
3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very
unpleasant

10
Very
pleasant

How much power do you feel you have on the Tanagram task?
1

2

3

4

Very little

5

6

7
A great
deal
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APPENDIX I
Lab Room Diagram

Individual
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APPENDIX J

Social Affiliative Desire by Condition
Social Affiliative Desire (Seat Chosen)

4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Christian Condition

Atheist Condition

Muslim Condition

Control Condition

Figure 1. Chart displays social affiliative desire as measured by seat choice and organized by
religious condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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APPENDIX K

Seat Chosen by Condition
25
20
15
10
5
0
Christian Condition

Atheist Condition
Chair 1

Figure 2.

Muslim Condition

Chair 2

Chair 3

Control Condition

Chair 4

Bar graph of seat chosen by participants broken down by religious condition.
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